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In Defense of “Super PACs” and of the First
Amendment
Joel M. Gora*
I. INTRODUCTION
Super PACs seem to have burst upon the electoral scene in 2010,
following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
1
United v. Federal Elections Commission. Like that decision, Super PACs
have generally drawn a bad press for similar reasons and from the
usual suspects. Critics claim they will buy our elections, steal our
2
democracy, and drown out the voices of the average voter. They will
allow the tiniest top sliver of “the 1%” to dominate our elections and
3
pollute our politics. We must find a way to stop them!
Well, of course, any attempt to “stop them” immediately bumps
into the First Amendment to the Constitution, which provides, in
relevant part, that: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
4
of grievances.” These efforts may also be contrary to the reasons why
the Framers wrote, and we cherish, those protections in the first
place: to have the most robust, uninhibited, and wide-open discussion
and debate about the politicians and the policies that have an
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I want to thank Anna Kordas,
Brooklyn Law School, class of 2014, for her research assistance on this article. Some
of the themes suggested in this article are also briefly set forth in Joel M. Gora, Free
Speech, Fair Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can They Co-Exist? 56 HOW. L. J. 763,
774–80 (2013). I should also note that as a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), I helped challenge the campaign finance restrictions at issue in
many of the cases discussed in this article, most notably, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) and Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
1
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2
See, e.g., Adam Lioz, Where The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Money in Politics
Meet, DEMOS, Sept. 13, 2012, http://www.demos.org/blog/where-voting-rights-act1965-and-money-politics-meet; Editorial, When Other Voices Are Drowned Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion/when-othervoices-are-drowned-out.html?_r=0.
3
Liz Kennedy, Stop The Next Citizens United, DEMOS, Sept. 10, 2013,
http://www.demos.org/publication/stop-next-citizens-united.
4
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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increasingly large impact on our everyday lives. The Framers’ goal
was to disable the government from controlling the political speech
and association indispensable to choosing and controlling the
5
government. Viewed in that light, Super PACs, far from being the
enemy of democracy, become its ally. This article is a defense of
Super PACs and of the First Amendment principles and imperatives
they embody and reflect.
II. THE ORIGINAL “SUPER PAC”
Sheldon Adelson—famous wealthy backer of Newt Gingrich and
Mitt Romney and staunch supporter of Israel and other causes—was
not the first big donor to a “Super PAC” in modern times. Arguably,
that honor belongs to a man named Randolph Phillips. His group
was not very “super” in financial terms, and it was not ultimately
found by a federal appellate court to be a political action committee
6
(PAC). Phillips was a relatively wealthy person and a liberal critic of
the war in Vietnam. In the spring of 1972, he and a few like-minded
friends, who were very upset about the way President Nixon was
conducting the war, decided to do something about it. They passed
the hat among themselves, raised a considerable amount of money—
slightly over $100,000 by today’s standards—and sponsored a two7
page ad in the New York Times. The ad was the print version of a
“negative” attack ad. It called Nixon a “war criminal,” accused him of
committing specific war crimes—such as ordering the bombing of
8
innocent civilian non-combatants—and urged that he be impeached.
The advertisement also praised a lonely handful of members of
9
Congress who had introduced an impeachment resolution. The ad
10
hoc group was called the National Committee for Impeachment.
No one paid much attention to the group or the ad, except for
the United States Department of Justice. They looked at the ad, and

5

See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966).
The statutory term is “political committee,” defined as a group that makes
contributions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing a federal election. See 2
U.S.C. §431(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2006). The term “political action committee” is a
popular, though not technically accurate, substitute. See Richard Briffault, Super
PACs, 96 MINN L. REV. 1644, 1652, n.11 (2012).
7
United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F. 2d 1135, 1136–37 (2d
Cir. 1972).
8
Note, Federal Election Campaign Act—Political Committee (United States v. National
Committee for Impeachment), 48 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 316, 318 (1973).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 317.
6
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at the calendar (it was May of an election year) and, with the passage
of the brand-new Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)—
which, for the first time, required serious regulation and disclosure of
any individual or group that spent any money “for the purpose of
11
influencing” a federal election —concluded that this was a campaign
12
ad under that new law. So the executive branch of the United States
Government—run, of course, by the President attacked in the ad—
through the Department of Justice, run by his friend, Attorney
General John Mitchell, brought the litigation weight of the United
States down on Phillips and his friends. The government’s theory was
that the ad was a campaign ad in “opposing” President Nixon, who
was up for re-election, and “supporting” the praised members of
Congress, also up for re-election, and, therefore, within the
13
regulatory ambit of the FECA. This meant that the group violated
that law by not registering with the government, failing to provide
information about its officers, receipts, and expenditures and failing
to disclose to the government the identity of anyone who had
contributed more than $100 to the activity—a ready-made “enemies
list” in the offing. This also meant that the group could not engage
in any future political speech of that kind without complying with the
14
new law. Indeed, the government sought an injunction against the
group’s further First Amendment activity unless it complied—an
almost unprecedented request for a prior restraint on speech.
The courts quickly dispatched this effort to suppress political
speech. A federal appeals court said that the First Amendment
15
requires giving a narrow scope to the FECA. The Court explained
that the FECA could not be used to regulate what we now call “issue
advocacy,” speech which criticizes—or supports—politicians and
public officials on the basis of the stance they take on issues and does
16
not constitute explicit electoral advocacy.
Here, the group was
concerned with war crimes, not with the election or defeat of
candidates—even though the ad pledged to raise funds for future ads
and for efforts to support candidates who saw things the same way as

11

See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–57 (2006)).
12
United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F. 2d 1135, 1136–37 (2d
Cir. 1972).
13
Id. at 1138.
14
Id. at 1136–37.
15
See id. at 1141.
16
See id. at 1142.
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17

the impeachment group.
The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), fearing that the theory of the government’s lawsuit might
threaten its own non-partisan, issue-oriented criticism of public
officials—most of whom were elected to office—filed suit and secured
a similar exemption from the campaign finance laws for its issue
18
advocacy. A proper balance between campaign finance regulations
and First Amendment rights seemed to have been reached.
III. THE ACHILLES HEEL OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE CONTROLS
This judicially-fashioned equilibrium between campaign finance
regulation and protected political advocacy would be upended a year
later when Congress, pointing to “Watergate” as a claimed
justification, passed new and sweeping expansions of the federal
19
campaign finance laws.
These campaign finance laws were
subsequently challenged on First Amendment grounds in the
20
landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo.
The new FECA provisions not only severely limited how much
money could be donated to or spent by candidates and their
campaigns, but also limited to a paltry $1,000 what any independent
individual or group could spend in an entire year “relative to a clearly
21
identified candidate.” That would barely pay for one 1/4 page ad
22
in the New York Times. Once you or your group sponsored that ad,
spending a dollar more on speech “relative to” a candidate became a
federal crime, subject to fine and imprisonment. That is a pretty
17

Note, supra note 8, at 319.
See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973),
vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., 422 U.S. 1030
(1975). One of the key players organizing the ACLU participation in both cases was
Ira Glasser, then the Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, the
New York State affiliate of the ACLU. Glasser, who would later become the long-time
Executive Director of the ACLU, championed the liberal organization’s opposition
to campaign finance restrictions as fundamentally inconsistent with robust free
speech, vigorous criticism of government, and enhanced political participation. See
Ira Glasser, Understanding the Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ira-glasser/understanding-the-emcitiz_b_447342
.html.
19
Joel M. Gora, Don’t Feed the Alligators: Government Funding of Political Speech and
the Unyielding Vigilance of the First Amendment, CATO S. CT. REV. 81, 88 (2010-2011).
20
See 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (involving an across-the-board challenge to the FECA
Amendments of 1974). See generally Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
21
18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13,
n.13.
22
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40.
18
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breathtaking prospect in a democracy, especially considering the First
Amendment’s language protecting the right of citizens to criticize
their government and those who run it. Overall, the new laws
seemed to cut to the heart of the First Amendment. They effectively
silenced any organized or effective criticism of politicians by limiting
the amount that could be spent on speech about them and their
conduct in office. Limiting the funding of speech clearly limits the
speech itself—how much one can say, how many issues one can
23
discuss, and how deeply one can discuss them.
That $1,000 limit on independent political speech, which would
silence or mute the Phillipses of yesteryear (not to mention the
Sheldon Adelsons, George Soroses and the David Kochs of today)
and, by doing so, all of us whose views they represent and whose
voices they amplify, seemed aimed at the heart of the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed, and in its landmark
Buckley decision, ruled that limits on how much money one can spend
24
for political speech are effective limits on that speech itself. The
Court’s reasoning is instructive for our debates today about the
validity of Super PACs.
First, the Buckley Court decided that the First Amendment
required the law limiting independent expenditures to be applied
narrowly and interpreted only to cover “express advocacy,” i.e. speech
which in express terms advocates the election or defeat of a political
25
candidate. Any broader application would threaten “issue” speech
involving candidates and undermine the whole point of the First
Amendment, which was to free up the ability of the citizenry to
26
criticize the government. Only independent speech that explicitly
advocated election or defeat could be regulated in any fashion by the
government, whether through prohibition, regulation, or
27
disclosure.
But even as so narrowed and limited, the law’s restriction still cut
to the very heart of the First Amendment right of the people to
criticize the policies and actions of the government and the
politicians who run it and to advocate their election or defeat. That
undermines both free speech and democracy, since you cannot have
one without the other. The government offered three rationales to
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 19.
See id. at 39.
Id. at 44.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–44.
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uphold this law and they are echoed strongly in today’s debates about
Super PACs specifically and campaign finance controls generally.
First, the government asserted that independent expenditures
for “outside” speech would corrupt the politicians helped by that
speech. Since contributions given directly to candidates were to be
limited to $1,000, in order to prevent corruption, independent
expenditures had to be limited to the same amount in order to
28
prevent the creation of a loophole in the law. The fear was that
supporters of candidates, limited in how much they could give to that
candidate, would go out and spend more money independently to
support that candidate; this practice had to be thwarted if the
contribution limits were going to be meaningful and effective. In a
way, the government had a point—after all, what’s the point of
limiting contributions to a candidate if the donor can go out and
spend much more money independently to help that candidate? But
the Court correctly observed that independent expenditures for
speech posed none of the “corruption” concerns posed by direct
29
contributions.
They were, by definition, independent and not
coordinated with the candidates or his campaign. So they could not
serve the same functions as contributions. And sometimes the
support might actually be most unwelcome—Nazis for Romney, for
30
one hypothetical example. Moreover, the Court noted, one of the
reasons it was willing to allow limitations on contributions to
candidates in the first place was that the donors would then be free to
go out independently and spend as much as they wanted to support
31
those same candidates—a kind of constitutional quid pro quo.
Finally, since such individuals or groups were now free to spend
unlimited amounts on speech that fell short of constituting “express
advocacy,” but might impact campaigns and elections nonetheless, it
was pointless to limit independent expenditures that did engage in
32
express advocacy.
So, the Court concluded, where independent
expenditures are concerned, the risks of corruption are low and the
First Amendment benefits, namely, ensuring robust, uninhibited, and
wide open debate on politics, politicians, and the conduct of

28

See id. at 44–45.
Id. at 46.
30
See id. at 47 (“Unlike contributions . . . independent expenditures may well
provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove
counterproductive.”).
31
See id. at 45.
32
See id. at 47–48.
29
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33

government, are high.
Second, the government argued the Adelsons and Phillipses of
the world had to be restrained in order to, as the well-worn phrase
34
goes, “level the playing field.”
This is also like a negative
“redistribution of speech”: those that can afford to engage in more
speech should be limited so that those who lack the resources for
speech will not be disadvantaged. This philosophy is also frequently
called the “equality” rationale for campaign finance limitations, a
kind of lowest common denominator version of free speech. This
35
was a “one person, one picket sign” kind of approach.
But the
Court sharply rejected the argument that the government interest in
“equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence
the outcome of elections” justifies controls on independent political
speech advocating election or defeat of candidates:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed to secure the ‘widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources,’ and to ‘assure the unfettered
exchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.’
The First
Amendment’s
protection
against
governmental
abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to
depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public

33

Buckley, at 45–48.
Id. at 48–49.
35
The argument borrowed a theme from the Supreme Court’s “one person, one
vote” ruling that required each electoral district to contain approximately the same
number of voters in order to end the gross malapportionment where some districts
had ten times as many people as others, undermining the influence of the voters in
the more populous districts. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Buckley
Court rejected this analogy, reasoning that equal political opportunity in
apportioning electoral districts did not justify a principle of equally limited speech.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49, n.55. A similar theme was invoked by the so-called “access
to the media” movement, which argued that the concentration of media power in a
relatively few hands undermined the First Amendment and democracy. See Jerome
A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644
(1967). As with the FECA effort to limit speech in order to equalize it, the Court
resoundingly rejected this form of speech distribution as well by striking down a
“right of reply” statute which compelled the media to offer free space for rebuttals by
those whom it had criticized. Such a government-run requirement and mechanism
was anathema to free press and free speech principles. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1974).
34
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36

discussion.
The Court’s description of the purposes of the First Amendment,
where campaign finance and independent speech is concerned, fits
both Randolph Phillips and Sheldon Adelson perfectly.
The government’s final argument to justify campaign finance
limitations on independent expenditures was built on the idea that
campaigns had become too expensive, that their heavy use of thirtysecond television ads was not what the First Amendment was about
and that we simply had too much uninformative and unreflective
campaign speech which had to be limited. The Court rejected that
theory in no uncertain terms:
The First Amendment denies government the power to
determine that spending to promote one’s views is wasteful,
excessive or unwise. In the free society ordained by our
Constitution it is not the government, but the people
individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as
associations and political committees who must retain
control over the quantity and range of debate on public
37
issues on a political campaign.
This insight fits the framework of democracy well, and is reflected in
the high-spending, vibrant, exciting political campaigns we have been
conducting in America in recent years. It also reflects a libertarian,
anti-censorship theme, which has sounded throughout the Court’s
38
First Amendment jurisprudence for a generation now.
Sheldon Adelson can thank the Supreme Court’s wisdom in the
Buckley case for giving constitutional validation to what he is doing to
support his views on government and politics, advocate for those
candidates who share those views and will implement those policies
and amplify the voices of those who think and believe as he does. In
doing so, as the Court in Buckley suggested, he is advancing the cause
39
of democracy. Ever since Buckley, with one exception, the Court has
reaffirmed that independent campaign expenditures lie at the core
of the First Amendment and cannot be limited. The Court applied
40
this principle to a small donor PAC, a nonprofit ideological
36

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49–50 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 57.
38
See Joel M. Gora, An Essay in Honor of Robert Sedler, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1087,
1091–98 (2012) (discussing cases in a variety of First Amendment areas where the
Court has used the anti-censorship theme to reject restrictions on speech).
39
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
40
See Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480 (1985).
37
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41

corporation funded only by individuals, and to independent
42
expenditures by political parties to support their candidates. All are
free to spend money for independent political advocacy.
The major doctrinal exception was spelled out in the Court’s
43
1990 decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which held
that corporations could be silenced from engaging in independent
candidate advocacy because they have too much wealth, which might
44
be used to distort the political process.
Put another way,
corporations might exercise too much political speech and therefore
need to be restrained. That same reasoning was again employed a
45
decade later in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission which relied
on Austin to justify the McCain-Feingold law which banned any
corporation—profit, nonprofit, shareholder or closely-held, large,
medium, or small—and any labor union from sponsoring any
broadcast advertisement that even stated the name of a politician
46
during the months before an election.
It was these two cases which the Court overturned, properly in
my view, in its well-known Citizens United decision, ruling that just
because an organization or group might use its resources to engage
in free speech, Congress is not justified in banning or limiting it from
47
doing so. In so ruling, the Court swept away all of the pointless
distinctions and limitations on expenditures for independent
political speech. Individuals and groups, along with corporations,
unions, and nonprofit organizations, all have the same First
Amendment rights to use their resources to get out their messages
48
about government and the officials who run it. As a result, the
Court upheld the right of a conservative, nonprofit advocacy
corporation to make, distribute, and advertise a movie criticizing a

41

See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1976).
See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518
U.S. 604 (1996).
43
494 U.S. 652 (1990) overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
44
Id. at 660.
45
540 U.S. 93 (2003) overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
46
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 201, 2 U.S.C. 434(f).
47
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
48
See generally Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
935, (2011) (suggesting that the Court properly interpreted the First Amendment in
the Citizens United case as not allowing distinctions among different persons and
groups where the right to engage in political speech is concerned).
42
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leading candidate for President of the United States. What more
classic embodiment of First Amendment activity could you find?
In Citizens United, the Court took the Buckley principles of
protecting the financing of political speech by people, and especially
independent speech, and made clear that they applied to
organizations of people as well—namely, corporations, nonprofits,
and labor unions. But at the core of both cases is the notion that the
activities of the Adelsons and the Phillipses, far from being
condemned and demonized, should be applauded and praised as
embodiments of the purposes and implementations of the most
important First Amendment principle of all: the insistence on more
speech, not government-enforced silence. Citizens United is certainly
an important case for protecting independent political speech, but
the seeds were planted thirty-five years ago in Buckley.
From Citizens United, it was but a short step to eliminate any
doubts that if one person, group, or organization can spend
independently without restraint on political speech, they can
associate together for the same purposes and without restraint. Free
speech plus freedom to associate equals Super PACs. A lower court
50
decision, SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, along with
51
several advisory opinions promulgated by the FEC, makes that clear.
IV. THE ROAD TO TODAY’S SUPER PACS
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United is often pointed to
as facilitating the creation of Super PACs and opening “floodgates to
52
unlimited corporate spending” in elections. While the decision did
enhance the ability of corporations and other entities, like labor
unions, to participate in political speech, Citizens United alone should
not be blamed—or credited—for the creation of Super PACs. In fact,
the opponents of unrestrained campaign spending have
indiscriminately attacked both corporate political spending and
Super PACs in an effort, unfortunately quite successful, to create the
53
misimpression of one gigantic, corrupt, and undemocratic mess.
49

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
See 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
51
See discussion Infra Part IV.
52
Sean Siperstein, Citizens United v. We the People, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 20,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sean-siperstein/citizens-united-v-we-the_b_1219221.html.
53
See, e.g., Liz Kennedy, 10 Ways Citizens United Endangers Democracy, DEMOS,
Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.demos.org/publication/10-ways-citizens-united-endangersdemocracy; Chris Cillizza and Aaron Blake, Poll: Voters Want Super PACs to be Illegal,
50
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Three facts need to be kept in mind to sort out the purposely created
54
First, the corporation or entity spending on express
confusion.
political advocacy that Citizens United authorized never produced the
55
avalanche of corporate spending feared.
Second, the increased
Super PAC spending was mostly funded by large, indeed, very large,
donations from individuals—not corporations or unions—
56
independent spending which was valid from the time of Buckley.
Finally, to the extent that corporate—or union—money has been
funding electorally-related activities by nonprofit organizations, the
precise extent of which is unknown, that phenomenon well pre-dated
Citizens United, though that ruling might have given such funding a
57
psychological lift.
In terms of explicit legal encouragement, the so-called “Super
58
PAC frenzy” of 2010 and especially 2012 came about as a result of
several lower court decisions as well as certain advisory opinions
promulgated by the Federal Election Commission.
Once again, it all started with Buckley v. Valeo and the Court’s
holding that while Congress was at liberty to set limitations on
contributions to political campaigns in the interest of preventing
corruption or appearance thereof, the legislature had no legitimate
governmental interest in infringing on individuals’ freedom of
speech through limiting expenditures, especially independent
59
expenditures.
The Buckley Court did not deal directly with the
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/post/poll-voters-want-super-pacs-to-be-illegal/2012/03/12/gIQA6skT8R_blog
.html
54
See Dan Abrams, The Media’s Shameful, Inexcusable Distortion of the Citizens United
Decision, MEDIATE, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.mediaite.com/online/the-mediasshameful-inexcusable-distortion-of-the-supreme-courts-citizens-united-decision/
55
See Briffault, supra note 6, at 1674; see also Eduardo Porter, Business Losing Clout
in a G.O.P. Moving Right, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/09/04/business/economy/business-losing-clout-in-a-gop-movingright.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that corporate political spending never
materialized after Citizens United, despite all the dire predictions to the contrary).
56
See James Bennet, The New Price of American Politics, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 19,
2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the
/309086/.
57
See Dan Eggen, The Influence Industry: Activist Groups Want to Undo Ruling that
POST,
Jan.
18,
2012,
Led
to
‘Super
PAC’
Frenzy,
WASH.
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-18/politics/35440052_1_petition-drivepacs-watchdog-groups; see also Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the
Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22
/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html?_r=0
58
See Bai, supra note 57.
59
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45. An independent expenditure is an expenditure
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provision of the FECA banning unions and corporations, including
nonprofits, from using treasury funds for direct political campaign
60
contributions or expenditures. Instead, a corporation or a union
could pay the expenses to set up a PAC, which could then solicit and
use individual contributions that were limited in both source and
61
amount pursuant to the statute.
Following Buckley, courts generally struck down limits imposed
on independent expenditures, finding them to represent “direct and
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech” that could
62
not be justified by any governmental interest. On the other hand,
courts upheld contribution limits as an effective method of
preventing corruption, unless the limits were so low, as to prevent a
candidate from amassing enough funds to effectively advocate his or
63
her candidacy. Nonetheless, in 1981, the Supreme Court decided
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, in which the court struck
down a municipal ordinance setting contribution limits on donations
64
to committees formed to support or oppose ballot propositions. As
one scholar put it, the Court found that the contributions “pose[d]
no danger of corruption as they [did] not involve the election of a
65
candidate . . . .”
In 2002, Congress amended the FECA by adopting the
that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, but is
not made in cooperation or coordination with the candidate or the candidate’s
campaign. The Citizens United Court observed that the Buckley Court had not dealt
explicitly with the ban on corporate or union expenditures, but would have likely
invalidated such a ban if it had addressed the issue. See Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010).
60
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81; 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012). The ban on corporate / union contributions directly to
federal candidates has been upheld against a constitutional challenge. See Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003). A post-Citizens United case
reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (2012);
see generally Case Note, Fourth Circuit Holds That Ban on Corporate Direct Contributions
Does Not Violate First Amendment, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (2013) (analyzing Danielczyk).
61
Paul S. Ryan, Wisconsin Right to Life and the Resurrection of Furgatch, 19 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 130, 157–58 (2008) (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to
Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2660–61 (2007)); see also Fed. Election Comm’n Campaign
Guide, Corporations and Labor Organizations 9 (2007), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf.
62
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.
63
See id. at 21; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006) (finding that
contribution limits that are too stringent “can harm the electoral process by
preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent
officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability”).
64
See 454 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1981).
65
Briffault, supra note 6, at 1657.
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Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The BCRA retained the
broad ban on political contributions or expenditures using corporate
and union treasury funds, and implemented a new, additional ban on
corporate
or
union
expenditures
for
electioneering
66
communications. The court upheld the ban in McConnell v. FEC,
reasoning that Congress had a legitimate interest in controlling the
funding of ads that were the “functional equivalent of express
67
advocacy.”
Part of the concern was that such expenditures, like
direct contributions, might permit preferential access to politicians
for those sponsoring the ads.
In a series of post-McConnell decisions, several lower courts
reconsidered whether such preferential access necessarily constituted
corruption when applied to independent expenditures. In 2003, in
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a statute limiting
68
individual contributions to independent expenditure committees.
The court found that the legislature “failed to proffer sufficiently
convincing evidence which demonstrates that there is a danger of
corruption due to the presence of unchecked contributions” to
69
independent expenditure-only committees.
Subsequently, in
70
EMILYs List v. Federal Election Commission, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also ruled, in effect, that
“as independent expenditures are not corrupting, the contributions
71
funding them could not be corrupting.”
The Court first revisited corporate participation in independent
expenditures in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life
72
(“WRTL”). The case involved a nonprofit, 501(c)(4) organization,
which ran ads criticizing the State’s two United States Senators, one
of whom was up for reelection, on the pace of judicial confirmations.
The organization argued that the ads were not the “functional
66

See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81. Electioneering communications are defined as broadcast or similar medium
messages even mentioning or identifying a federal candidate near to an election. No
express advocacy is required.
67
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 203–07 (2003).
68
See 344 F.3d 418 (4th Cir. 2003).
69
Id. at 434.
70
581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
71
Briffault, supra note 6, at 1659. The statement by the court was technically
dicta. The case dealt with FEC regulations limiting which funds certain noncandidate-specific activity could be funded with and not with independent
expenditures specifically.
72
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
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equivalent” of express advocacy, and, thus qualified for a
constitutional exemption from the BCRA’s electioneering
73
The Court agreed, finding that the
communication restriction.
prohibition did not apply to corporate expenditures for
advertisements that did not constitute “express advocacy” or the
74
functional equivalent of “express advocacy.”
Effectively, “after
WRTL, . . . while corporations still could not expressly advocate for
candidates, they could do most of the issue advocacy they had done
75
before the electioneering-communication prohibition . . . .”
Finally, the Citizens United Court revisited the portion of
McConnell that upheld the ban on “electioneering communication,”
and concluded that the provision was unconstitutional as applied to
76
all types of advocacy by all types of entities. As is well known by now,
Citizens United, a nonprofit organization, financed with donations
from individuals and for-profit corporations, intended to air a film
77
entitled “Hillary: The Movie.”
The film, which mentioned then
Senator Hillary Clinton by name, was to be available in theaters, on
DVD, and through a video-on-demand channel beginning in
78
December of 2007.
Citizens United also intended to broadcast
television advertising to promote the film within thirty days of the
2008 primary elections, in violation of the ban pursuant to § 203 of
BCRA, codified under 2 U.S.C. § 441(b).
The Citizens United Court agreed with the Buckley Court, finding
that prevention of quid pro quo corruption was the only legitimate
governmental interest that could justify such infringement on
79
constitutional rights. The independent expenditures, however, due
to their lack of prearrangement and coordination with any candidate,
“[did] not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro
quo corruption,” and therefore their regulation was not justified,
80
whether the speaker was an individual or a corporate entity. The

73

Paul S. Ryan, Wisconsin Right to Life and the Resurrection of Furgatch, 19 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 130, 158 (2008).
74
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
75
James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission: “Precisely What WRTL Sought to Avoid”, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29.
76
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).
77
See id. at 320.
78
See Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech: Did the
Supreme Court Enhance Political Discourse or Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 69
(2010).
79
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345–46.
80
Id. at 360.
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Court reasoned that elections call for “more speech, not less” and
concluded that an “outright ban on corporate political speech during
81
the critical pre-election period . . .” was not permissible. Thus, as
indicated above, the portion of McConnell upholding the
constitutionality of BCRA’s ban on corporate and union funding of
electioneering communication was overruled, along with Austin v.
82
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the earlier decision that had
83
allowed limits on independent expenditures by corporations. As a
result, all corporations—and unions—were free to use treasury funds
leading up to the elections.
This did not, however, affect contribution limits or prohibitions
that corporations, unions, and individuals were subject to when
84
contributing funds to PACs. Thus, following the Court’s decision in
Citizens United, opponents of campaign finance limits challenged
these contribution limits both in courts and through the FEC. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
was first to proclaim in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission that
Congress had no anti-corruption interest in limiting the amount or
85
source of contributions to an independent group. Filing suit well
before the decision in Citizens United came down, SpeechNow.org
(“SpeechNow”), a nonprofit, unincorporated association, planned to
accept contributions only from individuals, and not corporations, in
excess of federal limitations, to engage in “independent
expenditures” expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate, but without cooperation with or at the request
86
or suggestion of such candidate.
The court concluded that
contribution limits as applied to SpeechNow “violate[d] the First
Amendment by preventing [individuals] from donating to
SpeechNow in excess of the limits and by prohibiting SpeechNow
87
from accepting donations in excess of the limits.”
Shortly after the Court of Appeals issued the decision, the FEC
released two advisory opinions, which extended the SpeechNow
holding to general public corporations, and labor unions, allowing
them to contribute unlimited funds to PACs, provided that the funds
81

Id. at 361.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) overruled by
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
83
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
84
See 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2011).
85
See 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
86
See id. at 690.
87
Id. at 696.
82
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were used solely for independent expenditures and not for direct
88
contributions. In Advisory Opinion 2010-09, the FEC allowed Club
for Growth, a 501(c)(4) corporation established to participate
exclusively in independent expenditures, to solicit unlimited
89
contributions from the general public.
On the same date, in
Advisory Opinion 2010-11, the FEC determined that Commonsense
Ten, a registered nonconnected political committee (i.e. one not
sponsored by a corporation or union), that intended to make only
independent expenditures, could solicit and accept unlimited
contributions from corporations and labor organizations in addition
to the general public. The combination of the decisions by the FEC
90
and the courts led to the creation of the so-called Super PACs, also
91
referred to as “independent-expenditure-only committees (IEOCs),”
capable of unlimited fundraising for independent expenditures and
unlimited non-coordinated spending.
In addition, another recent decision by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia allowed regular PACs to function
like Super PACs as long as they maintained separate accounts
exclusively for independent expenditures. The organization at issue
in Carey v. Federal Election Commission—the National Defense PAC
(NDPAC)—was planning on making direct political contributions
92
and independent expenditures from two separate accounts. The
court ruled and the FEC agreed that the contribution limits would
not be enforced against the PAC with regard to contributions NDPAC
received to make independent expenditures, as long as the
organization maintained separate bank accounts for (1) independent
88

See Commonsense Ten, A.O. 2010-11, 2010 WL 3184269 (Fed. Election
Comm’n July 22, 2010); Club for Growth, A.O. 2010-09, 2010 WL3184267 (Fed.
Election Comm’n July 22, 2010).
89
Traditional PACs can only solicit contributions from certain categories of
individuals known as “the restricted class.” See Fed. Election Comm’n Campaign
Guide, Corporations and Labor Organizations, 20 (2007), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf. For a corporation, such a class consists of the
corporation’s executive and administrative personnel, the stockholders and their
family members. For labor union, the class includes “union members, its executive
and administrative personnel and families of both groups.” Id. at 20–21.
90
Eliza Newlin Carney, FEC Rulings Open Door for “Super” PACs, NAT’L J., Aug. 2,
2010,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/fec-rulingsopen-door-for-super-pacs-20100802.
91
R. Sam Garrett, “Super PACs” in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for Congress,
CONG.
RESEARCH
SERV.
2
(Oct.
6,
2011),
available
at
http://op.bna.com/der.nsf/id/rtar-8n6pkq/$File
/Super%20Pacs%20in%20Federal%20Elections.pdf.Super
92
See 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 127 (D.D.C. 2011).
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expenditures and (2) source and amount limited contributions for
93
the purpose of making candidate contributions.
Thus, today’s Super PACs were born, through a complicated
process, ultimately tracing its progenitor to Buckley v. Valeo, but with
94
the important moment of midwifery by Citizens United.
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? THE VERDICT ON SUPER PACS
Are these Super PACs—anchored in Buckley, with a crucial assist
from Citizens United and SpeechNow.org—wrecking our democracy and
putting our government up for sale to the highest bidder? That is
what many charge: there is too much speech; it is all so negative; it
gives some points of view an unfair advantage; it will give undue
95
access and influence to the Big Spenders. That is not what I see on
our electoral landscape. In the 2012 elections I saw Presidential and
Congressional campaigns where the generous funding generated the
kind of robust, wide-open, vigorous, unrestrained, competitive, and
informative political campaigns that our elections should be and that
our democracy requires. And Super PACs play an important role in
fueling that debate and generating that interest. To those who
complain about the “cacophony” that all of this campaign spending
and speech is causing, the Supreme Court has provided an apt
response: “[t]hat the air may at times seem filled with verbal
96
cacophony is . . . not a sign of weakness but of strength.”
Current estimates put the total spending on the 2012 federal
97
elections at approximately $7.3 billion. Of that amount, perhaps $2
billion, or less than one third, was spent by “outside” groups and
98
individuals—Super PACs, nonprofits, and others. Of that $2 billion
only approximately $383 million has been estimated to have come
from undisclosed sources, and none from Super PACs which are
99
subjected to extensive disclosure. Thus, the so-called “dark money”
93

See id. at 132.
New Jersey has recently recognized the validity of Super PACs in state
elections. See Matt Friedman, State Campaign Finance Agency Lifts Political Contribution
Caps for Independent Groups, NJ.COM, (May 28, 2013 2:33 PM), http://www.nj.com
/politics/index.ssf/2013/05/state_campaign_finance_lifts_p.html.
95
See Editorial, The Cacophony of Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/opinion/the-cacophony-of-money.html.
96
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
97
See Current Issues in Campaign Finance Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On Crime and Terrorism, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Bradley A. Smith,
Chairman, Center for Competitive Politics).
98
See id.
99
See id.
94

GORA (DO NOT DELETE)

1202

10/22/2013 2:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1185

or unreported money accounted for less than five percent of total
100
election-related spending, and none of it involved Super PACs.
The amount of Super PAC spending has been estimated to be
between $600 million and $800 million, approximately ten percent of
101
overall federal spending.
This was a dramatic increase over such
spending in the 2010 Congressional elections, but was
understandable since spending surrounding campaigns typically
increases during Presidential election years; moreover, 2012 was a
102
year with key hotly contested and expensive Senate races. Despite
the myths and half truths about Super PACs, they are playing an
important role in our elections by amplifying the voices of the people
whose viewpoints they represent. Nor is big corporate money
swamping these elections. In fact, precisely the opposite is the case.
As the New York Times recently reported, very few public
corporations contribute to Super PACs, and “[v]irtually no public
corporations have spent their own money directly in political
campaigns, a practice now permitted under the Supreme Court’s
103
Citizens United decision.”
So, the immediate, post-decision hysteria
that corporations would control our elections has proven to be totally
unfounded.
On the other hand, most of the money contributed to Super
PACs comes from individuals, though a significant amount has come
from unions and nonprofit organizations. To be sure, a large portion
of the Super PAC funding has come from a relatively small number of
very wealthy individuals. But the same can be said for ownership of
major news media and sponsorship of major foundations, all of which
are part of our political debate. Unless we want to impose some kind
of across-the-board leveling principle on any individual’s annual
financial participation in politics and government—a kind of “one
100

See id.
Estimates vary as to the precise amount. See Briffault, supra note 6, at n.2 (“In
2010, Super PAC spending exceeded ten percent of total candidate spending in
sixteen Senate and House elections.”). One of the campaign spending monitor
groups puts the number at $609 million.
Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
www.opensecrets.org/pacs/Superpacs.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
102
See R. Sam Garrett, Super PACs in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for
Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 18 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf;
see
also,
Super
PACs,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, www.opensecrets.org/pacs/Superpacs.php (last visited Sept. 26,
2013) (estimating Super PAC spending at $609 million).
103
Nicholas Confessore, S.E.C. Gets Plea: Force Companies to Air Donations, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2013, at A1. To be sure, some corporations—as well as many
unions—may be funding nonprofit 501(c)(4) organizations, but that is a different
issue from Super PACs.
101
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person/one picket sign” rule—we should celebrate the outputs, not
condemn the inputs.
Similarly, Super PACs are anything but secret, and their funds
are anything but “dark money.” On the contrary, those committees
are fully registered with the Federal Election Commission, and they
have to file periodic reports identifying everyone who contributes
even a penny more than $200 in an entire calendar year—a trivially
low amount, which sacrifices political privacy and anonymity for no
substantial government purpose. These committees must also detail
expenditures, and they have to report any broadcast ads that
constitute “electioneering communications” almost immediately.
That is why we know so much about Sheldon Adelson and all the
other people and groups that fund Super PACs.
As to the responsibility for “negative” “attack” ads, do not blame
the Super PACs alone. The candidates themselves and their
campaigns also showed a real appetite for brutal and harsh
commentary about their opponents. Just look at the numerous 2012
attack ads on Governor Mitt Romney and Bain Capital by the Obama
104
Campaign. Finally, more often than not, Super PACs come to the
aid of challengers and newcomers seeking to unseat incumbents and
entrenched interests. In a real sense, the Super PACs have done
their fair share to “level the playing field.”
The enhanced
competitiveness that they provide gives a shot in the arm to
competitive politics, which, in turn, rejuvenates our political system
and our democracy.
Unfortunately, the public has been told a different story, one
which blames Citizens United for unleashing the “flood of unfettered
105
political spending.”
“Not since the Gilded Age has our politics
been opened so wide to corporate contributions and donations from
106
However, what many fail to realize is that while
secret sources.”
some Super PAC funds do come from corporations and unions, “the
104

See, e.g., Sara Dover, Obama Attack Ad Brings Up Mitt Romney’s Swiss Bank
Account, INT’L BUS. TIMES, May 1, 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/
obama-attack-ad-brings-mitt-romneys-swiss-bank-account-694006; Helene Cooper and
Michael D. Shear, Facing Criticism, Obama Defends Ads Attacking Romney’s Record at Bain
TIMES,
May
21,
2012,
Capital,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/us/politics/
obama-defends-attacks-on-romneys-record-at-bain.html?_r=0.
105
Molly Ball, Did Citizens United Help Democrats in 2012?, NAT’L J. (Dec. 3, 2012
11:13 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/
did-citizens-united-help-democrats-in-2012-20121203?mrefid=site_search.
106
Bennet, supra note 56.
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vast majority have been provided by wealthy individuals who, well
before Citizens United, were permitted to spend unlimited sums
independently, but were subject to a federal statutory limit of $5000
on the amounts they could give to the federal PACs that expressly
107
support or oppose federal candidates.”
As previously explained,
independent spending PACs were permitted to solicit unlimited
donations from corporations, labor unions, and the general public
after the FEC promulgated two advisory opinions post-Citizens United.
Likewise, despite all of the dire warnings that right-wing money
would control the 2012 elections, President Obama secured
reelection handily, and the Republicans managed to lose several
Senate races they expected to win. The Republicans kept control of
the House, but by a narrower margin. Overall, there was a good deal
of spending on all sides, and lots of spending by conservative groups
and Super PACs. But when the dust settled, despite all of that
spending and the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by
conservative groups attacking Democrats, little changed in
108
Congress. The Republican Party lost two seats in the Senate, which
went to a Democrat and an Independent, and eight seats in the
House of Representatives, with all eight seats now occupied by newly
109
elected Democrats.
Ezra Klein described the myths that the media purveyed to the
public concerning the role of money in the 2012 elections. Klein, a
prominent political observer and journalist, introduced a recent
panel discussion on money, politics, and inequality with the following
mea culpa:
But it’s hard to look at the 2012 election, with its record
fundraising and the flood of Super PACs and all the rest of
it, and come away really persuaded that money was a
decisive player. And yet the way we talked about money in
the run-up to the 2012 election, we really suggested it would
be a decisive player. In fact, we suggested, quite often, that
it wouldn’t just decide the election, but that it would
107

Briffault, supra note 6, at 1645. The constitutionality of such a ceiling as
applied to donations to an independent spending group has been in question ever
since Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurring opinion in CMA v. FEC, 454 U.S. 182, 203
(1981).
108
Matthew DeLuca & Michael Keller, Not-So-Super PACs: 2012’s Winners and
DAILY
BEAST
(Nov.
15,
2012
4:45
AM),
Losers,
THE
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/15
/not-so-Super-pacs-2012-s-winners-and-losers.html.
109
House Races, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/election-results2012/house.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody (last visited Sept. 26 2013).
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imperil democracy itself. So I think we have some
explaining to do. And I think this panel is a good time to
110
start.
So, in the final analysis, what is the harm in letting the Adelsons,
the Kochs, and the Soroses spend vast amounts of money to support
political activity and the ideas they believe? Two answers are usually
given.
First, no one person should have too much speech. But that flies
directly in the face of a core First Amendment principle to encourage
more speech, not to coerce silence, as campaign finance limits do. It
also undermines the core purpose of the First Amendment: to get as
much information to the public as possible, especially about
government and politics and public officials. Indeed, democracy is
dependent on the most well-informed electorate rather than one
forced to get their information from limited sources. Similarly, the
Adelsons of the world give voice to and amplify the voices of all of the
people who believe as they do. If I agree with him, then when he
speaks or supports speech, he speaks for me. My speech is leveraged
by his. And, if he has too much speech, how much is too much? If
the First Amendment allows the principle of not allowing any one
person or group to have too much speech, or spend too much money
on too much speech, should we take away Rupert Murdoch’s media
empire, or George Soros’s foundation empire? Under such a leveling
principle, we would also have to address the difficult question of
exactly what speech we are covering here with our “too much”
blanket: express advocacy speech, mere mention of a candidate
speech, issue speech? And, of course, do not forget that we are
letting a government full of incumbents make all these rules and
appoint the people who will enforce them. The recent exposure of
IRS political harassment of conservative groups provides a timely
reminder, if one were necessary, of the perils of putting the fox in
111
charge of the chicken coop.
Finally, we have never insisted on
some kind of proportional representation between the resources
available to support an idea and the popularity of that idea. If we
110

Ezra Klein, We got way too excited about money in the 2012 elections, WONK BLOG,
(May 6, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp
/2013/05/06/we-got-way-too-excited-over-money-in-the-2012-elections/.
111
See Jonathan Weisman, Scrutiny of Political Nonprofits Sets Off Claim of
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07
/us/politics/irs-scrutiny-of-political-groups-stirs-harassment-claim.html
?pagewanted=all; see also Summary of IRS News, TAX PROF BLOG,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/irs_news/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).

GORA (DO NOT DELETE)

1206

10/22/2013 2:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1185

had, none of the rights movements of the last half century would
have been possible, because they started out as unpopular or
unaccepted ideas and required extensive resources to lift their voices
and get their messages out; the gay rights movement is only one
112
recent prominent example.
Second, no person should have too much political influence
based on their financial resources. But people and groups that use
their resources to help elect candidates whose policies they support
will always have influence with those candidates if they are elected.
Once again, that is not corruption, but democracy—a feature, not a
bug, of our system. It is why we have elections, so we can do all we
can to support the candidates of our choice with the understanding
they will carry out the policies we supported them to carry out in the
first place. One major union devoted tens of millions of dollars to
help elect President Obama in 2008 on the expectation that his
113
policies would be labor-friendly if he was elected.
And to ensure
that was the case, the president of that union visited the White House
on a dozen occasions in the first two years of the Obama
114
Administration.
By the way, of course, the much-reviled Citizens
United decision freed up unions to spend money to support favored
candidates just as it freed up corporations. This illustrates what many
political scientists have shown: policy does not follow support,
115
support follows policy. In short, there is no harm and much benefit
in what the Super PACs and their supporters do.
There is only one severe drawback in all of this unlimited
112

Civil rights groups such as the NAACP and the ACLU depended on a relatively
small number of large donors to help them get started with their controversial
causes. See Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J. L & POL’Y
93, 108–09 (1997). The same has been true of other left-wing groups. See Ben
Joravsky, Seed Money: The Crossroads Fund, a Foundation for the Left-out, CHICAGO
READER, Apr. 14, 1988, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/seed-money-thecrossroads-fund-a-foundation-for-the-leftout/Content?oid=872064#.UlniP27kL7c.email. In contemporary times, the same has
been true for the gay rights movement. See Erik Eckholm, Supporters of Same-Sex
Marriage
See
Room
for
Victories,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
30,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/us/politics/gay-marriage-supportors-hope-towin-in-4-states.html?ref=erikeckholm&_r=0.
113
See Steven Greenhouse, Obama Receives Union Endorsements, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
2008), available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/obama-to-getunion-endorsement/.
114
Steven Greenhouse, In Obama, Labor Finds the Support It Expected, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/washington
/02labor.html.
115
See Daniel Hays Lowenstein et. al., Election Law: Cases and Materials 676–79
(5th ed., 2012).
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political giving and spending, which is, by and large, so beneficial for
our democracy. That is that our two most central, important political
actors—our candidates and our parties—have to fight their political
battles with one hand tied behind their back.
While their
116
expenditures cannot be limited, contributions to them can be. As a
result, candidates and parties face the prospect of being outspent by
independent individuals and groups who are no longer restrained in
terms of what they can raise and spend. That is a potential imbalance
117
in our political and electoral speech system that should concern us.
In light of all the unrestrained independent spending, we need
to revisit whether the continued limits on contributions to parties
and candidates serve any of the purposes claimed for them or that
are recognized as constitutionally acceptable. Maybe we should finish
the job that Buckley solved only partially, that Citizens United improved
considerably, but that still needs to be studied. That task is to develop
a system of no limits on political giving and spending to expand the
speech that is fostered thereby, smart disclosure of large
contributions to candidates to assess improper influence potential,
and, even more broadly, serious public funding to raise the playing
field for all candidates. If this approach seems a bit jarring, consider
the opposite end of the spectrum of alternatives: putting the
government in charge of how much political speech we the people
can have by ceding plenary control over the funding of that speech to
the very government that our political speech is supposed to monitor,
control, and change. That strikes me as the scariest proposition of
all, and one that the First Amendment should not tolerate. I will take
my chances with the wisdom and good judgment of the people, not
the government.

116

The basic $1,000 contribution limit, upheld in Buckley, is still the law, though it
has been statutorily adjusted for inflation and is currently $2,600. The question of
the validity of aggregate contribution limits is currently before the Court in
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2012), prob.
juris.
noted,
133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013). See Joel M. Gora, McCutcheon v. FEC and The Fork In the
Road, SCOTUS Blog, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08
/symposium-mccutcheon-v-fec-and-the-fork-in-the-road/prob.
117
See generally PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA, BETTER PARTIES, BETTER
GOVERNMENT: A REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2009).

